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CoNFLICTs OF LAw-DrvoRCE-REs JunrcATA EFFECT oF DECREE AS TO

TmRD PARTIES-Respondent had applied for a determination of petitioner's
rights under the New York Decedent Estate Law,1 which provides for the widow
taking a statutory one-third share in her husband's estate after his decease. Respondent contended that petitioner was not a widow of decedent, as the prior
divorce awarded against decedent in Florida was void because of failure to satisfy residence requirements. The evidence showed that the residence requirements had not been met, but also showed both of the parties to the divorce to
have made appearances in the Florida court. The trial and intermediate courts
held that respondent had no right to attack collaterally the foreign decree, but the
N~w York Court of Appeals reversed. 2 On certiorari, held, reversed. The Court
concluded, Justice Frankfurter dissenting, that under Florida law the respondent
would have no standing to make a collateral attack on the Florida jurisdiction,
and New York is obliged to act in the same manner. Johnson 11. Muelberger,
340 U.S. 581, 71 S.Ct. 474 (1951).
The decision in the principal case settles a problem which has been the subject of intense discussion among courts and legal writers.3 In order to appreciate the full significance of the decision, it is helpful to review briefly the
developments leading up to this case. The Supreme Court, in Davis 11. Davis,4
clearly established that whe~ the parties to a divorce proceeding litigate the jurisdiction of the court making the award, then that question is foreclosed from
collateral attack by the parties in a subsequent action. Later, the principle of
res judicata was applied against the parties in respect to jurisdictional authority
even though jurisdiction was not a litigated question, providing both parties had
made appearances and there had been an opportunity to question the jurisdiction
of the court.5 The decision in the principal case carries the doctrine of res judicata one step further and establishes that the full faith and credit clause, as implemented by statute,6 requires a sister state to prevent collateral attack by third
parties if such attack is not allowed in the jurisdiction where the decree was
rendered. It should be noted that the role of the sister state court is different in
this situation than when the sister state court is allowed to make a finding in
respect to domicile when an ex parte divorce decree is in question, as here the :6.nd113 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §18.
2 Matter of Johnson, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E. (2d) 44 (1950).
3Notes: 17 BnooKLYN L. RBv. 70 (1950); 1951 WASH. Umv. L.Q. 1 (1951); 19
FORDHAM L. RBv. 327 (1950) which discusses the New York Court of Appeals decision
of the principal case; 50 CoL. L. RBv. 833 (1950); Gaylord v. Gaylord, (Fla. 1950) 45 S.
(2d) 507; Mussey v. Mussey, 251 Ala. 439, 37 S. (2d) 921 (1948); Rediker v. Rediker,
35 Cal. (2d) 796, 221 P. (2d) 1 (1950).
4 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3 (1938).
5 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S.
378, 68 S.Ct. 1094 (1948).
6 Art. IV, §1, of the United States Constitution provides, "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of.every other
State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effects thereof." Congress has performed
this function by 62 Stat. L. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §1738.
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ing is a matter of law and not of fact. 7 The sister state court, in allowing or refusing a subsequent collateral attack, must look to the law of the divorcing state.
Although it may be said that the approach to the problem of collateral attack is now
firmly established as a result of this decision, both court and counsel will be faced
with a tremendous task in accurately applying it to specific cases. This very difficulty is evident in the principal case, as the error of the New York Court of
Appeals was not in their approach to the problem, but rather, in their erroneous
findings as to the existing law in the divorcing state. 8 Some courts refuse collateral
attacks by third parties on the basis of privity with an original party who would be
barred by reason of res judicata. 9 Other courts refuse collateral attack on the theory
that the third party does not have sufficient interest to make such an attack, but
even among these courts there is a variation of opinion as to the sufficiency of interest and the time when the interests vest.10 It may easily be seen that a sister
state court is liable to misconstrue the law of the divorcing state in extreme cases,
which will require, in tum, further litigation of the issue. In the field of divorce
law, where social policy calls for as much stability as possible, it is unfortunate
that the state courts can n<;>t be given a more definite method of approaching the
question of collateral attack by third parties. Courts and counsel alike may well
recall Justice Jackson's remark: "confusion now hath maqe his masterpiece"
in the field of divorce law.11

Paul M. D. Harrison, S. Ed.

7By virtue of the case of Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207
(1942), it is established that a court may decree a binding ex parte divorce if one of the
divorcing spouses has a bona fide domicile within the state. However, by the later case of
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092 (1945), it was held that a
sister state may determine for itself whether a bona fide domicile did in fact exist in the
divorcing state before giving effect to the foreign decree. This means, of course, that the
finding of fact will bear materially on the recognition of the foreign decree. On the problem of domicile in general, see Frumer, "The Supreme Court and Domicile for the Purpose of Ex Parte Divorce Jurisdiction," 1 SYRAcusB L. Rav. 267 (1949).
8 State ex rel. Willys v. Chillingworth, 124 Fla. 274, 168 S. 249 (1936), was construed by the New York court as allowing third party collateral attack. The Supreme
Court in the principal case disagrees with such an interpretation. A later Florida case,
deMarigny v. deMarigny, (Fla. 1949) 43 S. (2d) 442, appears conclusively to express
Florida law that collateral attack will not be allowed.
9Watson v. Watson, 172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33 (1933) (holding privity); Matter of
Lindgren, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E. (2d) 849 (1944) (rejecting privity). Compare the
seeming conHict in Estate of Davis, 38 Cal. App. (2d) 579, 101 P. (2d) 761 (1940) and
Estate of Paul, 77 Cal. App. (2d) 403, 175 P. (2d) 284 (1946). Annotation of case
authority in 12 A.L.R. (2d) 717 (1950).
10 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E. (2d) 135 (1949); Mumma
v. Mumma, 86 Cal. App. (2d) 133, 194 P. (2d) 24 (1948); 49 C.J.S., Judgments §414
(1947). Annotation in 12 A.LR. (2d) 717 (1950).
11 Quoted by Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674
at 676, 69 S.Ct. 751 (1949).

